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INTRODUCTION
A woman who is addicted to heroin discovers that she is pregnant. She
quickly realizes her limited options: continue to use heroin, quit “cold turkey,” 1 or
seek medical rehabilitation. She learns that if she chooses to quit cold turkey, she is
likely to miscarry. On the other hand, should she continue to use heroin, the state
will take away her child, once born. In review of these possibilities, she believes
seeking medical rehabilitation, such as a methadone-treatment program, will be the
most responsible decision. However, she soon learns that because her child could
suffer withdrawal symptoms at birth, state child services will strip her of custody
and accuse her with civil child abuse and neglect before she even leaves the delivery
room.
Many pregnant women across the country who are addicted to heroin and
other opiates face this reality.2 In N.J. Division of Youth & Family Services v. Y.N., the
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division addressed this catch-22 situation.3
The court held that under a New Jersey civil statute dealing with child abuse, 4 a
pregnant woman obtaining doctor-recommended methadone treatment that

1
“Cold turkey” is the “abrupt withdrawal of narcotics from an addict without the use of
medications to reduce the discomfort and minimize the symptoms resulting therefrom.” Andrew G.
Bucaro & Mary Williams Cazalas, Methadone: Treatment and Control of Narcotic Addiction, 44 TUL.
L. REV. 14, 19 (1969).
2
Heroin is just one type of opiate, but for the purposes of this Note, I will be using “heroin”
and “opiate” interchangeably.
3
66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
4
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (West 2012).
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Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

Vol. 4, Issue 1

harmed the fetus had committed child abuse.5 After the New Jersey Division of
Youth and Family Services took the woman’s newborn son into custody, she filed
suit to regain custody of her child.6
Child protective services’ removal of an infant because of the mother’s
participation in methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) during pregnancy
alarmingly violates those women’s rights.7 These rights include, but are not limited
to, those provided in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which
precludes public entities from discriminating against individuals on the basis of a
disability.8 In cases such as Y.N., a state agency’s removal of a child because of his or
her mother’s participation in a drug rehabilitation program counteracts the exact
purpose of Title II of the ADA: to protect individuals with disabilities from
discrimination.9
This Note will explain how Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 is violated when a state department takes custody of an infant solely because
his or her mother participated in a methadone maintenance program during
pregnancy. Part I of this Note examines the case of Y.N.—a case that demonstrates
why the ADA is necessary to protect both women and their children. Part II of this
Note provides a background on methadone maintenance treatment, with a focus on
how it is the recommended and preferred treatment for pregnant women with
opiate addictions. Part II also briefly discusses how the New Jersey state legislature’s
policies, as interpreted by the appellate court, are misguided and run counter to
state interests in maternal and fetal health. Part III reviews the flawed legal analysis
used by the appellate court in the case of N.J. Division of Youth & Family Services v.
Y.N.,10 and how the standard set by the appellate court in this case leads to an
overbroad application of the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute by depriving
pregnant women of choices regarding daily activities. Part IV describes the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and explores interpretations of Title II. This
5
See Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242 (“The fact that defendant obtained the methadone from a legal source
does not preclude our consideration of the harm it caused to the newborn. An inquiry under N.J.S.A.
9:6–8.21 must focus on the harm to the child, rather than on the intent of the caregiver. G.S. v. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 180–81, 723 A.2d 612 (1999). Harm to the child need not be intentional
in order to substantiate a finding of abuse or neglect. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III,
990 A.2d 1097, 1106 (2010).”).
6
See Y.N., 66 A.3d at 239.
7
Pregnancy and state intervention has created numerous constitutional arguments amongst
legal scholars. For discussions that a woman’s constitutional liberties and autonomy are violated
when medical choices are restricted by the state, see, for example, Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law
by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381 (2008); see also Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy &
Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 277 (1989).
8
A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUST. C.R. DIV. (July 2009),
http://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm.
9
See Y.N., 66 A.3d 237; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).
10
66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
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exploration reveals the purpose of Title II of the ADA and provides guidance for how
courts should interpret it in the future. Finally, Part V ties the analysis together to
explain how Title II of the ADA protects the parental rights of pregnant women
participating in MMT.
I.

THE HARM OF OVERBROAD STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE
CASE OF Y.N.
Y.N. had been using prescription Percocet11 prior to her pregnancy.12 Upon
learning of her pregnancy, she continued to use Percocet for four months before
entering a methadone treatment program.13 Y.N. began taking methadone
prescribed by her doctor on January 5, 201114 and continued the methadone
treatment through February 18, 2011,15 when she gave birth to her son, Paul.16 Upon
birth, Paul tested positive for methadone and was diagnosed with neonatal
abstinence syndrome (NAS).17 Due to Paul’s withdrawal symptoms, he was placed in
the neonatal intensive care unit and given morphine doses to manage the effects of
his withdrawal.18
The New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (“Division”) quickly
began an investigation of Y.N.19 When Paul was due to be released from the hospital,
on April 1, 2011, the Division placed a hold preventing his discharge.20 “The Division
then filed a complaint and order to show cause seeking custody, care, and
supervision of Paul.”21 Upon review of the case, the judge decided the Division had
not established that Y.N. presented a risk of harm to her child, and the child was
released to Y.N.’s custody, pending Y.N.’s negative drug screening.22 Because Y.N.
failed this screening, the Division retained supervision and care of the child.23
A fact-finding hearing was held on June 29, 2011. 24 At this hearing, Y.N.
testified and the infant’s medical records were examined.25 Y.N. testified that she
was taking prescribed Percocet when she became pregnant and was told that if she
11
Percocet contains oxycodone; oxycodone is an opioid pain medication. Percocet,
DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/percocet.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
12
Oral Argument at 02:10, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244 (N. J. 2014)
(No. 072804), http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-24-13.
13
Y.N., 66 A.3d at 241.
14
Id. at 239.
15
See id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 239–40.
18
Id. at 240; see also id. at 242( “Paul’s discharge summary indicates that it took thirty-nine
days until the morphine could be discontinued.”).
19
Id. at 240.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
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stopped taking Percocet, she could lose the baby due to withdrawal.26 The trial court
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Y.N. abused or neglected Paul.27
When the case reached the appellate court, the court relied on the “harm”
element of New Jersey’s civil child abuse and neglect statute.28 The statute provides
a definition for an “abused or neglected child”:
[A] child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or
guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing
the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or
allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof.29

The appellate court’s broad interpretation of the harm element was the sole basis
for the court’s finding.30 Contrary to traditional child custody proceedings, the court
ignored the requisite statutory elements for child abuse and broadly applied the
statue to any harm inflicted on an infant.31 The child abuse or neglect statute clearly
dictates that harm inflicted on a child by a parent must be unreasonable.32 Instead
of applying the statutory element of unreasonable harm to the case at hand, the
court simply recounted the harm suffered by the infant. This misapplication of New
Jersey’s child abuse or neglect statute constitutes a “sweeping, confounding
generalization that completely ignores [the] statutory elements.”33
Infant Paul undeniably suffered harm from withdrawal symptoms due to his
mother’s methadone use during pregnancy. However, the statutory provision at
issue requires unreasonable harm to prevent unnecessary removal of a child and
judicial overreach. In turning a blind eye to the reasonableness element of the
statute, the court essentially held that any harm caused by the mother to a newborn
during pregnancy constitutes child abuse. Y.N. appealed this decision, and the
Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to review the issue of statutory
interpretation regarding “whether a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6–
8.21(c)(4)(b) can be based solely on the harm caused to Paul by methadone

26
Id.
27
Id.
28
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (West 2012); Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242.
29
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (emphasis added).
30
See Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242.
31
Id.
32
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b).
33
Oral Argument at 04:00, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244 (N. J. 2014)
(No. 072804), http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-24-13.
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withdrawal—without regard to whether [Y.N.] acted unreasonably or with a
minimum degree of care.”34
On December 22, 2014, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the holding
of the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, holding that “absent
exceptional circumstances, a finding of abuse or neglect cannot be sustained based
solely on a newborn’s enduring methadone withdrawal following a mother’s timely
participation in a bona fide treatment program prescribed by a licensed healthcare
professional to whom she has made full disclosure.”35 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey remanded the case to the appellate division to decide whether the record
contained sufficient evidence to support the finding of child abuse or neglect on an
alternate theory.36
II.

PROMISES FOR A HEALTHIER FUTURE: METHADONE MAINTENANCE
TREATMENT
Methadone maintenance treatment was first studied at The Rockefeller
University in 1964 as a research project.37 After decades of research and use of MMT
to treat heroin addiction, experts discovered the proper dosage of methadone to
overcome many symptoms of opiate addiction.38 MMT has proved to be a successful
form of rehabilitation for opiate addicts.39 MMT reduces cravings for opiate drugs,
prevents opiate withdrawal symptoms, and blocks the physical effects of other

34
N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244, 251–52 (N.J. 2014) (emphasis
omitted). Y.N.’s continued drug use for four months after finding out she was pregnant could be
classified as acting unreasonably or without a minimum degree of care. However, the public interest
of maternal and fetal health should dissuade policymakers from punishing pregnant drug addicts for
seeking medical rehabilitation.
35
Id. at 246.
36
Id. at 256.
37
Herman Joseph, Sharon Stancliff & John Langrod, Methadone Maintenance Treatment
(MMT): A Review of Historical and Clinical Issues, 67 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 347, 348 (2000).
38
See id. at 348–49 (explaining the proper dose of methadone will be sufficient to relieve
narcotic cravings, suppress opioid abstinence syndrome for twenty-four to thirty-six hours, block the
effects of heroin, develop tolerance to the narcotic effects of methadone so the individual’s emotional
responses, functions, and perception are not impaired, and develop tolerance to analgesic properties
of methadone).
39
See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) about Methadone and Pregnancy, NAT’L ADVOCS. FOR
PREGNANT WOMEN, http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/MethadoneFAQ.pdf (last visited Jan. 6,
2015) [hereinafter FAQ about Methadone and Pregnancy]; see also Methadone Treatment for Pregnant
Women, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2006), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/SAMHSA
%20Brochure%20%2522Methadone%20Treatment%20for%20Pregnant%20Women%2522.pdf;
Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women & Am. Soc’y Addiction Med., Opioid Abuse,
Dependence, and Addiction in Pregnancy, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2012),
http://acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for
-Underserved-Women/Opioid-Abuse-Dependence-and-Addiction-in-Pregnancy.
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opiates.40 The use of MMT has consistently demonstrated a reduction in illicit drug
use and a significant drop in the likelihood of overdose and death.41
Since the 1970s, MMT has been the optimal treatment for heroin addiction
for pregnant women.42 MMT “remains the gold standard” for treating opiate
addiction in pregnant women.43 There is a clear medical consensus that MMT during
pregnancy provides benefits for both the woman and the fetus. 44 The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention declared methadone maintenance treatment “the
most effective treatment for opiate addiction” and included “improved pregnancy
outcomes” as one of the important benefits of MMT. 45 The United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that MMT can save a
newborn’s life by blocking withdrawal symptoms.46 The World Health Organization
(WHO) published a “strong”—as opposed to standard—recommendation that
methadone maintenance treatment should be used to treat opiate dependency in
pregnancy.47 The WHO reserves “strong” recommendations for treatments or
interventions that “most individuals should receive . . . [and] most individuals would
want . . . and only a small proportion would not[;]” and further stating that “the
recommendation could unequivocally be used for policy making.”48 The WHO went
as far as to recommend MMT over all other opiate agonist maintenance
treatments.49
The evidence supporting MMT over other forms of treatment for opiate
addicts is “clear and unambiguous.”50 Because of the clear and unambiguous
evidence supporting MMT, the National Institutes of Health considers “the safety
40
FAQ about Methadone and Pregnancy, supra note 39.
41
Id.
42
See Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae Experts in Maternal and Fetal Health, Public Health, and
Drug Treatment in Support of Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Certification at 6, N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. Y.N., 66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (No. A–5880–11T2) [hereinafter
Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae]; see also Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women & Am.
Soc’y Addiction Med., supra note 39.
43
Stacy Seikel, Methadone Treatment in Pregnancy…That Can’t Be Right, Can It?, 63 N.E. FLA.
MED. 28, 29 (2012).
44
See, e.g., Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 8–9.
45
Methadone Maintenance Treatment, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 2002),
http://www.nhts.net/media/Methadone%20Maintenance%20Treatment%20(20).pdf.
46
See Methadone Treatment for Pregnant Women, supra note 39.
47
See Guidelines for the Psychosocially Assisted Pharmacological Treatment of Opioid
Dependence, WORLD HEALTH ORG. xviii (2009), http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/o
pioid_dependence_guidelines.pdf.
48
Id. at xiii (explaining that standard recommendations are given when “most individuals
would want the suggested course of action, but an appreciable proportion would not,” and “values
and preferences vary widely”).
49
See id. at xi.
50
Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 7 (citing L. Amato, M. Davoli, C.A. Perucci,
M. Ferri, F. Faggiano & R.P. Mattick, An Overview of Systematic Reviews of the Effectiveness of Opiate
Maintenance Therapies: Available Evidence to Inform Clinical Practice and Research, 28 J. SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT 321, 326 (2005)).
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and efficacy of methadone treatment ‘unequivocally established’” and supports
MMT “as the most effective treatment for this condition.”51
Not only does use of MMT for opiate-addicted pregnant women reduce
maternal illness and mortality rates, but it also promotes fetal growth and stability,
as compared to mothers who use heroin during pregnancy.52 MMT during
pregnancy is associated with “better compliance with obstetric care and better
preparation for parenting responsibilities.”53
Maternal recovery from illicit drug addiction is important for the long-term
health and safety of a mother and her child.54 Methadone treatment during
pregnancy increases the likelihood of the mother achieving recovery from her
addiction early in treatment and becoming a sustainable provider.55
A.

Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome
Although MMT remains the best treatment to combat opiate addiction
during pregnancy, it is likely to cause neonatal abstinence syndrome in infants.56
NAS manifests as “the constellation of symptoms and signs exhibited by infants, who
had intrauterine exposure to addictive drugs like opiates . . .[,] which can cause
physical and psychological dependence.”57
NAS in infants is an expected and medically controllable consequence of
methadone use during pregnancy.58 The intensity of NAS symptoms and the medical
care required is case specific.59 Infants who experience mild symptoms resulting
from NAS may not need any medical treatment,60 while infants who experience
moderate to severe symptoms of NAS are treated with medication-assisted
withdrawal methods, which can require anywhere from three to five weeks of
hospital monitoring.61

51
Id. at 7–8.
52
See John J. McCarthy, Martin H. Leamon, Michael S. Parr & Barbara Anania, High-Dose
Methadone Maintenance in Pregnancy: Maternal and Neonatal Outcomes, 193 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 606 (2005).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 609.
56
See Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 355; see also C. Dryden, D. Young, M. Hepburn & H.
Mactier, Maternal Methadone Use in Pregnancy: Factors Associated with the Development of Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome and Implications for Healthcare Resources, 116 BJOG 665 (2009).
57
V. Tiroumourougane Serane & Ommen Kurian, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, 75 INDIAN J.
PEDIATRICS 911 (2008).
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., id.; Seikel, supra note 43, at 29.
60
McCarthy et al., supra note 52.
61
Id.
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Regardless of the intensity of the symptoms experienced, infants who suffer
from NAS do not face long-term physical or mental disabilities or abnormalities. 62
Infants born to mothers who received both methadone treatment during pregnancy
and prenatal care showed normal development.63 HHS reported that babies born to
mothers on methadone do as well as other babies, and better than babies born to
mothers on heroin.64 While use of a methadone treatment regimen by a pregnant
woman can cause some complications in the first few weeks of the infant’s life, these
complications are medically manageable.65 Medical studies show that possible
complications are outweighed by the benefits of methadone treatment: stable opiate
levels for the pregnant woman and fetus (drastically decreasing the likelihood of
fetal death) and disassociation from the heroine lifestyle and its negative
consequences.66
B.

Policy Implications of Pregnant Women, MMT & State Intervention
Punishing women for seeking treatment for their opiate addictions
negatively impacts the health of the women and their unborn children. Pregnant
women who quit opiate use cold turkey risk fetal death due to fetal withdrawal
symptoms.67 Pregnant women who continue to use heroin subject the fetus to daily
fluctuations of opiate abstinence syndrome, which can result in “stillbirth,
premature delivery, low birth weight, and sudden infant death syndrome.”68 In
addition to fetal harm or death, the lifestyle associated with heroin addiction can
cause various harms to pregnant women: transmission of diseases such as HIV and
hepatitis, poor nutrition, and other complications from the use of contaminated
needles.69
Medical experts have considered the delicate balance between protecting
fetuses from unnecessary harm and incentivizing pregnant women to seek medical
care for the wellbeing of the women and the fetuses. While MMT alone is
insufficient to combat all of the issues a heroin addict must confront, when MMT is
combined with prenatal care, medical care, nutritional counseling, and attention to
62
See Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 356 (“[N]o chronic conditions or abnormalities attributable
to methadone have been identified in those children exposed to methadone in utero when their
mothers also received prenatal care.”).
63
Id. (“A follow-up study of 25 four-year-olds whose mothers were maintained on methadone
during their pregnancies and who had received prenatal care showed normal development . . . The
results of all neurological examinations were within normal parameters, and there was no
relationship between IQ scores and the severity of the abstinence syndrome at time of birth. There
were no statistical differences between the infants exposed to methadone in utero and non-exposed
controls.”).
64
Methadone Treatment for Pregnant Women, supra note 46.
65
Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 356.
66
See, e.g., id. at 355.
67
See FAQ about Methadone and Pregnancy, supra note 39.
68
Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 355.
69
Id.
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all the medical, personal, and social concerns the patient may face, a pregnant
woman can overcome her heroin addiction in a manner that is healthy for both
herself and the fetus.70
Without the option to receive MMT, many pregnant women will completely
forgo necessary medical and prenatal care out of fear that the government will take
their children away.71 This is not the first time in history that pregnant drug addicts
have faced discrimination. During the “crack baby” scare of the 1980’s,72 Congress
passed laws to extend the length of criminal sentences for crack cocaine offenses. 73
Pregnant women were targeted and routinely prosecuted for use of crack cocaine.74
Today, women who take proactive steps to curb drug addiction are punished with
removal of their children from their custody and faced with potential criminal
charges for the use of MMT during pregnancy.
Legislative policies related to pregnant women undergoing MMT should
reflect the research of medical and scientific experts and should be focused on
improving maternal and infant health. Enacting policies in such a way has been
termed by Professor Dawn Johnsen, a legal scholar in the area of civil liberties, as
the “facilitative model.”75 The facilitative model operates under the assumption that
each pregnant woman is in the best situation to decide for herself how to balance
reducing risks for unhealthy fetal development with competing demands and
desires.76 Such competing interests include whether “to continue working in their
jobs” while dealing with “illness, addiction, poor information, lack of health
insurance, and poverty.”77 A facilitative model is the most effective model in cases
of women using drugs during pregnancy;78 policies that are enacted according to the
facilitative model can save government dollars while providing benefits to the
pregnant woman and her fetus.79
70
See id.
71
Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 3; see also Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 392. This
disincentive to seek prenatal care is reminiscent of the “crack baby” scare in the 1980’s. In the 1980’s,
the fear of losing custody of their babies or being arrested caused pregnant crack cocaine addicts to
avoid seeking prenatal care. Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror:
Deconstructing Drug War Mythology, 31 SOC. JUST. 182, 194 (2004).
72
E.g., Clay Dillow, How Science Got the ‘Crack Baby’ Epidemic So Wrong, POPULAR SCI. (May
20, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-05/crack-baby-epidemic-never-happened.
73
Reinarman & Levine, supra note 71, at 182.
74
See Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 386.
75
See Dawn E. Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing
Women’s Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 573 (1992).
76
Id. at 573 (explaining the core assumption of facilitative policies is that maternal and infant
health can best be improved by “building on the shared interests of women and the government”).
77
Id. at 574. It could be argued that a woman who abused drugs is not the best person to make
decisions regarding her competing desires and demands. However, in this Note, I discuss women
who have sought medical rehabilitation to overcome drug addiction. These women are receiving
treatment to become healthy and aid fetal development.
78
Id. at 571–72.
79
Id. at 574.
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For pregnant women, the government has a strong interest in implementing
policies that will positively impact the likelihood that the woman’s baby will be
healthy.80 While a woman is pregnant, “the government can affect fetal
development, and thus the health of the infant at birth, only through the woman’s
body and actions.”81 However, if formulated improperly, government policies aimed
at healthy births and healthy children can result in the opposite effect.82
Negative social stigmas that exist regarding drug addicts, especially regarding
pregnant drug addicts, often lead to irrational policymaking. These stigmas have
caused the legislature and courts to view drug addicts as second-class citizens. Since
the beginning of MMT programs, people undergoing the treatment have been
stigmatized as merely “substitut[ing] one drug for another.”83 This belief blurs the
crucial line between “an active heroin addiction and the use of methadone in a
maintenance program.”84 As a result, the legislature has enacted policies based on
the adversarial model,85 in which the pregnant woman and fetus are viewed as two
distinct entities with competing interests.86
The appellate court’s interpretation of the New Jersey model, in which a
pregnant woman can be charged with civil child abuse for participating in MMT, is
an example of a policy enacted under the adversarial approach that punishes women
for seeking necessary medical treatment while pregnant.87 The policy deters women
from seeking necessary prenatal care, medical services, and other rehabilitation
treatment by instilling fear of government intervention, civil child abuse and neglect
charges, loss of custody, and criminal prosecution.
When a drug addict seeks medical help to overcome the addiction (whether
pregnant or not), the state has a public health interest in encouraging the
individual’s rehabilitation. This interest increases in the case of pregnant drug
addicts, for the state then has an interest in the health of the woman and the fetus.
80
Id. at 570.
81
Id.
82
See id. at 570–71 (“[T]he most effective policies for improving the health of newborns are
those that facilitate women’s choices, not those that infringe on their liberty.”).
83
Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 358.
84
Id.
85
See Johnsen, supra note 75, at 576.
86
Id. In November 2014, Colorado voters rejected a “personhood” measure (for the third time),
which proposed inclusion of unborn fetuses as “children” under the state’s criminal code. Zach
Schonfeld, Fetal ‘Personhood’ Laws Defeated in Colorado and North Dakota, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 5, 2014,
3:27 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/fetal-personhood-laws-defeated-colorado-and-north-dakota282545. North Dakota voters rejected a ballot measure, which would have added to the state
constitution: “[t]he inalienable right to life of every human being at any stage of development must
be recognized and protected.” Tierney Sneed, A Tale of Two ‘Personhood’ Amendments, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Oct. 29, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/10/29/personhoo
d-amendments-shake-up-elections-in-north-dakota-colorado. State “personhood” proposals in the
2014 election reflected the idea of treating the pregnant woman and fetus as two separate entities
with conflicting interests. Id.
87
See infra Part III.
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The overwhelming amount of medical and scientific research supporting MMT for
pregnant women should lead policymakers to enact policies that support this
medical consensus. If the public interests are the health of the fetus and the mother,
these ends are not achieved by penalizing women for seeking help to overcome their
addiction.
III.

EXPLORING THE APPELLATE COURT’S REASONING IN Y.N.
Returning to the case of Y.N., the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate
Division applied the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute in a manner so broad
that it did not even consider the statutory language or purpose. The statute requires
unreasonable harm or risk of harm for a finding of child abuse or neglect. 88
Therefore, the proper inquiry should have examined whether the harm Y.N. caused
to her infant was reasonable.
While conducting a reasonableness analysis, it is important to note that the
newborn tested positive for methadone, but not Percocet.89 The State never alleged
that Y.N. was using illegal drugs during her pregnancy. Furthermore, methadone
maintenance treatment is easily distinguished from illicit drugs used by a mother
during pregnancy.90 As discussed earlier, MMT is well regarded as the appropriate
treatment for opiate addiction.91 Besides Y.N.’s use of prescribed methadone
treatment, there were no other findings of child abuse or neglect by Y.N.92
Therefore, the State’s basis for removing the child relied solely on the fact that Y.N.
used her prescribed methadone treatment.
Determining whether a pregnant woman’s actions were “reasonable” during
pregnancy is purely a subjective test; the legislature does not provide a clear line for
how “unreasonable” a pregnant woman’s actions would need to be in order to satisfy
the child abuse or neglect statute. Almost all daily activities of a pregnant woman
have the ability to affect the fetus and potentially cause harm. For example, a woman
could be charged with child abuse for exercising too much during pregnancy if it
had a negative impact on the fetus that the state classified as “unreasonable harm.”
In another scenario, a woman’s refusal to take expensive prenatal vitamins that
would benefit the fetus could be deemed unreasonable. These scenarios are just a
few of many that show the line between reasonable and unreasonable harm to a
fetus is blurred in instances of a pregnant woman’s legal activity.93
88
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.21(c)(4)(b) (West 2013).
89
Oral Argument at 02:33, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244 (N. J. 2014)
(No. 072804), http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-24-13.
90
See, e.g., Ilene B. Anderson & Thomas E. Kearney, Use of Methadone, 172 WEST J. MED. 43
(2000).
91
See supra Part II.
92
See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 66 A.3d 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
93
The Alabama Supreme Court held that a “child” under the chemical-endangerment statues
includes all unborn children. Therefore, a woman can be held criminally liable for exposing a fetus
to, “a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.” Ex parte Hicks v. Ala., 153
So.3d 53, 54–55 (Ala. 2014) (citing Ala. Code § 26-15-3.2 (2014)).
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Even if one was to accept the legitimacy of the reasonableness provision of
the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute, Y.N.’s conduct during her pregnancy
was reasonable in light of her particular circumstances. As a pregnant woman
addicted to opiates, Y.N. had three choices: (1) continue using opiates, which would
ultimately lead to child abuse charges and her child’s removal at birth; (2) abruptly
cease any drug use and face the possibility of miscarriage or stillbirth; or (3) seek
medical treatment for her drug addiction. Faced with three difficult choices, all of
which would likely result in some degree of harm to the fetus, Y.N. chose the most
reasonable—and medically recommended—option.
Instead of commending Y.N.’s proactive steps during her pregnancy, the
appellate court relied on In re Guardianship of K.H.O.94 to classify her infant’s
withdrawal symptoms as harm.95 The K.H.O. case differs drastically from the case of
Y.N. because the mother in K.H.O. was using heroin and the newborn suffered from
heroin withdrawal.96 Comparing the cases of K.H.O. and Y.N. illuminates the
problem with the broad application of civil child abuse statutes. Heroin is an illegal
drug that was not prescribed by a doctor to K.H.O.’s mother, and served no medical
purpose.97 An absence of all of these factors from the case of Y.N. demonstrates that
the application of K.H.O. was inapposite.
Most notably, the appellate court held that for child abuse and neglect
claims, it does not matter whether the pregnant woman was prescribed the
methadone, or whether she obtained it from an illegal source.98 This lies at the heart
of the catch-22 problem for pregnant women who need medical treatment during
their pregnancies. If a woman can be charged with child abuse or neglect from the
side effects suffered by the newborn for any drug she takes while pregnant,99 she is
less likely to seek proper and necessary medical treatment. In fact, she is likely to
forgo not only the treatment for her drug addiction, but also prenatal care as a
whole.100 And, as medical experts have noted in cases of drug addiction, if a pregnant
woman does not seek medical treatment, there is a possibility that the drug use—or
withdrawals from unsuccessful attempts to quit—will result in a miscarriage or
stillbirth.

94
736 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1999).
95
Y.N., 66 A.3d at 243 (citing In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246).
96
Id. at 1249.
97
See id.
98
Y.N., 66 A.3d at 242.
99
Id. at 241. The trial court based its finding of child abuse or neglect without distinguishing
methadone treatment from illicit drugs. The judge reasoned, “[w]hen a child is born drug exposed to
illicit drugs, we routinely say that’s abuse and neglect.” Id.
100
See Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae, supra note 42, at 3; see also Abuse Reporting and
Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician-Gynecologist, AM. CONGRESS OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS
(Jan. 2011), http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-onHealth-Care-for-Underserved-Women/Substance-Abuse-Reporting-and-Pregnancy-The-Role-of-th
e-Obstetrician-Gynecologist.
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Since methadone treatment improves the health and well-being of both the
pregnant woman and fetus, methadone is indistinguishable from other drugs
prescribed to pregnant women to improve or maintain fetal health. Many pregnant
women require prescription drug therapy due to a variety of conditions developed
during pregnancy.101 According to medical professionals, to promote the interest of
fetal safety, “effective drugs that have been in use for long periods are preferable to
newer alternatives.”102 Methadone has been tested and used to successfully treat
opiate addiction for decades.103
Many drugs used during pregnancy, whether prescribed by doctors or
available over the counter, result in increased the likelihood of fetal harm. For
example, a study of pregnant women who were prescribed antidepressants (tricyclic
antidepressants or selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) displayed a positive
correlation between the use of antidepressants in utero and a significantly increased
risk of preterm delivery.104 In utero fetal exposure to decongestants, one of the most
commonly used over-the-counter medications during pregnancy, has been shown
to result in birth defects to newborns.105 Therefore, under the appellate court’s
holding, even a pregnant woman who uses Sudafed for a common cold as per her
doctor’s advice can find herself facing child abuse and neglect charges.
The potential for fetal harm and birth defects resulting from use of these
drugs displays the difficult problem that results from trying to protect the health of
both the pregnant woman and the fetus separately. Fetal development, well-being,
and behavior are implicated by depression in pregnant women.106 However, if the
pregnant woman takes antidepressants, there is an increased chance of preterm
delivery.107 This exemplifies the reasons why medical professionals, in consultation
with their patients, should prescribe treatment regimens—not the courts.
101
Gideon Koren, Anne Pastuszak & Shinya Ito, Drugs in Pregnancy, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1128,
1135 (1998).
102
Id.
103
See Joseph et al., supra note 37, at 348.
104
See Hanan El Marroun, Vincent W. V. Jaddoe, James J. Hudziak, Sabine J. Roza, Eric A. P.
Steegers, Albert Hofman, Frank C. Verhulst, Tonya J. H. White, Bruno H. C. Stricker & Henning
Tiemeier, Maternal Use of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, Fetal Growth, and Risk of Adverse
Birth Outcomes, 69 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 706, 710 (2012); see also Robert L. Davis, David
Rubanowice, Heather McPhillips, Marsha A. Raebel, Susan E. Andrade, David Smith, Marianne
Ulcickas Yood & Richard Platt, Risks of Congenital Malformations and Perinatal Events Among
Infants Exposed to Antidepressant Medications During Pregnancy, 16 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY &
DRUG SAFETY 1086, 1093 (2007).
105
Wai-Ping Yau, Allen A. Mitchell, Kueiyu Joshua Lin, Martha M. Werler & Sonia HernándezDíaz, Use of Decongestants During Pregnancy and the Risk of Birth Defects, 178 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 198,
198 (2013) (“Epidemiologic studies of specific decongestants have identified elevated risks of specific
birth defects, including defects of the heart, eyes and ears, gut, abdominal wall, and feet.”).
106
See generally Judith Alder, Nadine Fink, Johannes Bitzer, Irene Hösli & Wolfgang Holzgreve,
Depression and Anxiety During Pregnancy: A Risk Factor for Obstetric, Fetal, and Neonatal Outcome?
A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 189 (2007).
107
See Hanan El Marroun, et al., supra note 104.
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A fetus should not be considered a separate “person” from the woman
carrying the fetus. Considering a fetus a separate “person” from the moment of
fertilization implicates a woman’s rights, including a woman’s ability to obtain MMT
during pregnancy.108 Recognizing a fertilized egg as a “person” will deprive a woman
of the choice to have an abortion.109 If a woman and her fetus are considered
separate people, a woman with a life-threatening pregnancy would not be able to
abort the fetus to save her own life.110
IV.

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was passed by an overwhelming
majority111 with the congressional intent of providing full and equal opportunity for
Americans with disabilities.112 The ADA provides protection for individuals who are
discriminated against based on their disability in various critical areas: “housing,
public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.”113
Title I of the ADA requires employers to provide qualified individuals with a
disability the equal opportunity to benefit from employment-related
opportunities.114 Title I prohibits employers from discriminating in “recruitment,
hiring, promotions, training, pay, social activities, and other privileges of
employment.”115 Title II of the ADA covers all state and local government activities,
regardless of the entity’s size or receipt of federal funding. 116 Title II requires state
and local governments to give people with disabilities the equal opportunity to
benefit from government programs, services, and activities.117 For instance, a
transportation provision is included in Title II, prohibiting public transportation
authorities from discriminating against people with disabilities in providing

108
See ACOG Statement on “Personhood” Measures, AM. CONGRESS OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/News_Room/News_Releases/201
2/Personhood_Measures.
109
See id.
110
Erik Eckholm, Push for ‘Personhood’ Amendment Represents New Tack in Abortion Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/us/politics/personhood-amendmentswould-ban-nearly-all-abortions.html?_r=0.
111
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 101 (1997).
112
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).
113
Id. § 12101(a)(3).
114
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012); A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, supra note 8.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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services.118 Title III of the ADA extends nondiscrimination requirements to private
entities, businesses, nonprofit service providers, and commercial facilities. 119
In particular, Title II of the ADA mandates: “[N]o qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”120 “Public entity” is defined broadly
in the statute: “any state or local government; any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”121
Title II applies to all state and federal activities, programs, and branches of state and
federal government, regardless of whether the program or activity receives federal
funding.122
While the scope of public entities covered by Title II of the ADA is not
enumerated, Congress and the United States Supreme Court have applied the
“public entity” standard broadly.123 The purpose statement of the ADA indicates that
Congress intended to “invoke the sweep of congressional authority” and eliminate
all forms of state discrimination.124 Title II specifically targets discrimination in
public services, which further indicates congressional intent to eliminate such
discrimination in the public sector.125
The Supreme Court has held that public services not enumerated by Title II
are still protected, as “the fact that the ADA can be ‘applied in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.’”126 Federal courts have broadly interpreted “service” under Title II to apply
to a wide array of public services: social services,127 arrests,128 education,129 housing,130

118
See, e.g., Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2004); Walter v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth., 434 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350–51 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Liberty Res., Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
155 F. Supp. 2d 242, 253 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“Improving transportation services for disabled persons is a
key component of the ADA.”).
119
42 U.S.C. § 12184(a).
120
Id. § 12132.
121
Id. §§ 12131(1)(A)–(B).
122
A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, supra note 8.
123
See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (stating that even though
the language in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) did not mention prisons, prisons fell squarely within the statutory
definition of “public entity” and the statute demonstrated “breadth,” not ambiguity).
124
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
125
Id. § 12132.
126
Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, 524 U.S. at 212 (holding the “public entity” requirement of Title II of
the ADA applies to state prisons (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
127
See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 261–62 (2d Cir. 2003).
128
See Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 567 (5th Cir. 2002).
129
See Smith v. Univ. of N.Y., No. 95–CV–0477E(H), 1997 WL 800882, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31,
1997); Garret v. Chicago Reform Bd. of Trs., No. 95–C–7341, 1996 WL 411319, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 19,
1996); Essen v. Bd. of Educ. of Ithaca City Sch. Dist., No. 92–CV–1164(FJS)(GJD), 1996 WL 191948, at
*9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1996).
130
See Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 F. App’x 603, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2004).
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loans,131 transportation,132 and even parole proceedings.133 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that “programs, services, or activities,” in Title II is a “catch-all
phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the
context.”134 Therefore, it follows that the Title II “public entity” provision may apply
to state child welfare services.
For purposes of Title II, a “qualified individual” is defined as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity. 135

“Disability” under Title II of the ADA is defined as: “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having such an
impairment.”136
The ADA does not expound upon what qualifies as an “impairment.” In 1989,
while discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,137 the Senate
enumerated “drug addiction” as one form of physical or mental impairment.138 Title
II of the ADA expressly excludes individuals who are “currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs.” 139 The statutory language of the ADA explains that the
exclusion of individuals currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs exception does
not apply to an individual who:
has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use; is participating in a supervised
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use; or is erroneously
regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use. 140

131
See Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003).
132
See Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
133
See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2002).
134
Innovative Health Sys. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997).
135
42 U.S.C. §12102(1) (2012).
136
Id. § 12102(1)(A)–(C).
137
Then known as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989.
138
S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (discussing the application of the term physical or mental
impairment. While the ADA differs in some regards from the Senate bill explained in the report, this
portion of the Senate bill did not change. The Senate’s report about the bill provides a non-exhaustive
list of examples of “physical or mental impairment”: “such conditions, diseases, and infections as:
orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy,
multiple sclerosis, infection with [HIV], cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism.”) (emphasis added).
139
42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
140
Id. § 12114(b)(1–3).
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Courts have applied this language to protect individuals who have fully recovered
from drug addiction or are in a rehabilitation program to recover from drug
addiction.141
When methadone is prescribed by a licensed medical professional, the
methadone, and use thereof, is not illegal.142 In cases, such as Y.N., when the state
child protection agency removes a child from the mother’s custody because of her
prescribed methadone use, the agency’s action falls outside of the “currently
engaging in” exception, and accordingly, violates Title II of the ADA.
A woman undergoing MMT is a “qualified individual with a disability” under
Title II of the ADA. Drug addiction is a form of mental impairment, and while a
woman is undergoing MMT, the woman does not fall under the “currently engaged
in the illegal use of drugs” exception. Additionally, a state child services department
qualifies as a “public entity” within Title II. However, it is less clear whether the
state’s child removal action would be considered Title II “discrimination.” Courts
have held that in order for an individual to state a claim that he or she has been
“subjected to discrimination” by a public entity, a plaintiff must prove that he or she
was either “excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public
entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by
the public entity,” and, “that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination
was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.”143 A plaintiff must satisfy both elements
of this two-part test in order to properly state a Title II claim.144
V.

EXTENDING TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF TITLE II TO COVER
PRENANT WOMEN PARTICIPATING IN MMT
Individuals participating in methadone maintenance treatment already
qualify as individuals with a disability under Title II of the ADA. Several federal
appellate courts have recognized that MMT patients are protected from
discrimination based on their disability.145

141
See, e.g., United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 922 (4th Cir. 1992).
142
See RICHARD A. RETTIG & ADAM YARMOLINSKY, FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE
TREATMENT 2 (1995).
143
Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 894
F.Supp. 1429 (D.Kan. 1994)); see also Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978
(9th Cir. 1997).
144
See Does 1–5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996).
145
See, e.g., New Directors Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2007); see
also MX Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a methadone clinic
bringing a suit on behalf of its patients was bringing suit on behalf of people with a disability who
were protected by ADA Title II); Bay Area Addiction Res. & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Child protection agencies are state agencies, and, as such, are subject to the
provisions of Title II of the ADA.146 Child protective services “is a specialized part of
the child welfare system,”147 which is funded and supervised by the state.148 The
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the breadth of Title II of the ADA149 further
proves that child protection agencies fall within the scope of Title II public entities.
New Jersey’s child welfare agency, the Department of Children and Families (DCF),
receives its budget from both state (general) funds, and federal funds.150 In 2010,
New Jersey’s Child Protection and Permanency Services, a division of DCF, expended
a majority of its money from federal funds.151 New Jersey’s DCF is a state agency,
which falls well within the Title II’s broad definition of “public entity.”
Applying the two-part test to determine whether a woman whose infant was
removed as a result of her participation in MMT while pregnant was “subjected to
discrimination” by child protection agencies reveals that this practice violates Title
II of the ADA. First, women who have their newborn children removed by a state
agency are subjected to discrimination by the agency because women who do not
participate in a drug rehabilitation program do not suffer the same consequence.
This satisfies the first prong of a Title II discrimination claim. Second, the
discrimination against women participating in MMT by state child protection
agencies is solely on the basis of the disability, that is, the woman’s status as a drug
rehabilitation program participant. Even if there is ambiguity as to whether these
women should be protected by Title II of the ADA, any ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of the medical consensus on the issue.
A problem many states may encounter in trying to comply with Title II of the
ADA, as applied to pregnant women, is the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA).152 CAPTA is a federal statute that requires health care providers who
care for infants to report to child protective services any cases of infants born that
are affected by illicit drug use or exhibit symptoms of withdrawal.153 Through
CAPTA, states are provided with federal funding to develop state child abuse and
neglect programs.154 CAPTA fails to distinguish between infants who are affected by
146
Chapter 5: The Child Welfare System: Removal, Reunification, and Termination, NAT’L
COUNCIL DISABILITY (2012), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sep272012/Ch5.
147
Id.
148
See Department of Children and Families, ST. N.J. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/omb/publications/12budget/pdf/16.pdf.
149
Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (holding the “public entity” requirement of Title II of the ADA applies to
state prisons)).
150
Department of Children and Families, supra note 148.
151
Id. ($233,521 was expended from federal funds; $192,231 was expended from general funds).
152
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–06 (2012)).
153
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, 117 Stat. 800 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
154
See Ellen M. Weber, Child Welfare Interventions for Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women:
Limitations of a Non-Public Health Response, 75 UMKC L. REV. 789, 792 (2007).
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their mothers’ illegal drug use and infants who are affected by their mothers’
participation in a rehabilitation program, such as MMT. In failing to acknowledge
this critical difference, CAPTA overreaches and subjects all women who undergo
MMT to state intervention upon the birth of their infant.155
While CAPTA requires mandatory reporting by health care providers, it
provides child welfare services with the discretion to decide whether to file an abuse
or neglect charge.156 Therefore, once an infant is reported to the state child welfare
services, in compliance with CAPTA, the state still has the opportunity to comply
with Title II of the ADA. The state’s child welfare services can investigate the report,
determine that the cause of the report is due to a mother’s proscribed MMT
treatment, and then decline to continue further proceedings. However, should a
State decide to file an abuse or neglect charge upon receiving a report under CAPTA
on the sole basis of the mother’s use of MMT during her pregnancy, the state child
welfare services would violate Title II of the ADA.
Any concerns that permitting methadone use during pregnancy would lead
to permitting or encouraging illegal drug use can be dismissed, as Title II of the ADA
would only reach medical care that is prescribed by a doctor to genuinely treat a
drug addiction.157 Many prescription drugs have the possibility of being abused, but
for these situations, the doctor plays a pivotal role in deciding what medication use
is bona fide.158
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decision in Y.N. complies with the ADA
Title II nondiscrimination by public entity provision and should serve as an example
for other state courts to follow. The Supreme Court of New Jersey properly held that
a finding of child abuse and neglect cannot be sustained based solely on a newborn’s
withdrawal symptoms due to a pregnant woman’s methadone use when it is part of
a prescribed methadone maintenance program. Additionally, the New Jersey child
abuse and neglect statute cannot be applied in a broad, discriminatory manner
155
Annie J. Rohan, Catherine Monk, Karen Marder & Nancy Reame, Prenatal Toxicology
Screening for Substance Abuse in Research: Codes and Consequences, 32 SUBST. ABUSE 159, 160 (2011)
(“In other states (South Carolina, Illinois, Iowa), it is presumed that a newborn has been neglected
and is removed from maternal custody when infant toxicology tests at birth demonstrate the
presence of a non-prescription controlled substance.”).
156
See, e.g., Steven J. Ondersma, Lorraine Halinka Malcoe & Sharon M. Simpson, Child
Protective Services’ Response to Prenatal Drug Exposure: Results From a Nationwide Survey, 25 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 657, 661 (2001).
157
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12114(a) (2012).
158
See Morlino v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., 706 A.2d 721, 732 (N.J. 1998). In this medical
malpractice case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated, “[i]n making diagnoses and selecting
among treatment options, doctors must rely on their training and experience, as well as such
considerations as the patient’s age, gender, and physical or mental condition. When evaluating those
variables, physicians should not act mechanically, but with due regard for the individual needs of
each patient. . . . Not recognizing the role of judgment in making a diagnosis or in deciding on a
course of treatment would be to deny an essential element in the practice of medicine.” Id.
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against pregnant women who participate in a drug rehabilitation program without
violating Title II of the ADA.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized the errors made by the
appellate court in conflating prescribed methadone treatment with illicit drug use,
and stressed the importance of “[s]trict adherence to the statutory standards” of the
New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute because of the high stakes of abuse or
neglect findings.159
In doing so, the Supreme Court of New Jersey properly took into account the
wealth of relevant medical and scientific research on MMT.160 Twenty-nine experts
in law, public health, drug treatment, children’s welfare, and maternal and fetal
health, 161 and twenty-six reputable institutions162 wrote an amicus brief in support
of the mother in the case of N.J. Division of Youth & Family Services v. Y.N.,163 urging
the Supreme Court of New Jersey to grant certiorari. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey considered the arguments made by the amicus curiae, which stressed the
importance and effectiveness of methadone treatment for drug addiction.164
In applying the New Jersey child abuse and neglect statute in an unjustifiably
broad manner, the appellate court left pregnant women without guidance as to
159
N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244, 252 (N.J. 2014) (explaining the
serious consequences of a finding of abuse or neglect, such as termination of a parent’s custodial
rights to a child and the parent’s name and information kept on file by the Department of Children
and Families).
160
Methadone has been researched and proved effective for over four decades. See Brief of
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which medical decisions made during pregnancy will constitute child abuse or
neglect. This uncertainty acts as a strong deterrent to pregnant women seeking
necessary, and often life-saving, medical care.165 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
condemned the detrimental reasoning of the appellate court as a “perverse
disincentive for a pregnant woman to seek medical help and enter a bona fide
detoxification treatment program that will address her and her baby’s health
needs.”166
While the newborn in the case of Y.N. suffered withdrawal symptoms, the
harm was not unreasonable.167 The expected and manageable harm caused to infants
from MMT is not evidence of child abuse or neglect. As in Y.N.’s case, an infant
suffering from NAS does not experience unreasonable harm under New Jersey’s
child abuse statute. A pregnant woman’s adherence to a bona fide medical treatment
should never be characterized as de jure abuse or neglect.
Furthermore, Y.N.’s use of methadone maintenance during pregnancy was
reasonable, as the research in support of methadone treatment for pregnant women
is clear and unambiguous.168 Medical research proves that methadone maintenance
during pregnancy, rather than the cessation of the use of opiates entirely, reduces
the likelihood of obstetrical complications and benefits fetal health.169 The
withdrawal symptoms, characterized as harm by the Division of Child Protection
and Permanency, are treatable with medical care.170 Infants who develop NAS, such
as the infant in this case, experience “minimal to no long-term” consequences.171
Title II of the ADA specifically prohibits public entities from discriminating
against qualified individuals with a disability based on their disability. In the case of
Y.N., the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services discriminated against
the mother, in violation of Title II, because of her participation in a MMT program.
The public entity (1) discriminated against Y.N. and, (2) such discrimination was by
reason of Y.N.’s disability. As a result, the Supreme Court of New Jersey accurately
found that the appellate court improperly applied the child abuse and neglect
statute. Otherwise, the consequences of upholding the appellate court’s ruling
would continue to negatively affect all pregnant women and their families. Pregnant
women frequently experience medical conditions that require medication, and most
of these medications have side effects.172 If the appellate court’s decision stood, any
165
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medical treatment or refusal of such treatment by pregnant women could serve as
the grounds for a finding of child abuse or neglect.
As shown in the case of Y.N., removing a child from his or her mother on the
basis of the mother’s use of prescribed methadone treatment during pregnancy
violates a woman’s rights under Title II of the ADA. MMT is the optimal treatment
for opiate addiction in pregnant women. MMT also promotes the public interest of
fetal and maternal health. Legislative policies should reflect the findings of the
medical community and should serve the purpose of promoting public health.
Upholding the ruling of the appellate court would have been in violation of
Title II of the ADA. Title II expressly protects individuals participating in drug
rehabilitation programs from discrimination by public entities. The removal of
children from women on the basis of the woman’s participation in MMT during
pregnancy violates this nondiscrimination provision.
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